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CHAPTER SEVEN
THUCYDIDES AND THE SOUL OF VICTORY:
OLYMPIC POLITICS IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BERNARD J. DOB SKI, JR.
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Thucydides comes down to us as the author of an account of the life and
death of Greek politics known traditionally as the History. 1 Because Thucydides
is widely considered a historian and not a philosopher, we do not think in the
first place to study him when we ask whether Socrates and the political
philosophy to which he gave birth form the roots of European identity. Indeed,
in the only work Thucydides leaves us, one encounters no philosopher and the
word "philosophy" is used only once (II.40. l ). And to our knowledge
Thucydides never spent any time with Socrates or his students.
But Thucydides' relevance to a Europe whose political identity has
increasingly come into question becomes clear when we reflect on the
justification of his great theme. The greatness of his work flows from the
character of the Hellenic civilization that the Peloponnesian war destroyed and
of which it was the peak. One may therefore understand Thucydides as the first
to account for and evaluate the origins of that civilization. For Thucydides, what
makes Greek civilization unique derives from the Greeks' discovery of politics,
understood as the emergence of and respect for the common good. If the ideal
embodied in Greek politics forms one of the pillars of European identity, then
turning to Thucydides should offer a useful corrective for a Europe that flirts
with the ideological temptation to, as one commentator suggests, abandon its
identity and be done with politics. 2 To be specific, Thucydides' work reminds
contemporary Europeans who seek to transcend their national boundaries of the
civilizing and moderating effects of political communities devoted to common,
and thus exclusive and particular, goods. The History thus provides a cautionary
tale for all those tempted by immoderate and utopian desires to abandon such
exclusive and particular communities.
But what does this have to do with Socrates? When we reflect on the
traditional classification of Thucydides as a historian we discover that this label
rests partly on an anachronism; his work precedes the emergence and hardening
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of the divisions between the sciences, themselves originating much later in the
work of Aristotle. And in claiming to present the enduring truths regarding the
nature of man and of politics through an account of a single event, Thucydides
comes to sight as neither historian nor philosopher nor poet, as Aristotle
understood them, but some combination of all three. Indeed, the very form and
content of the History force us to question the rigidity of such distinctions and
the epistemological assumptions they embody. His claims to universal insight
coupled with his unremitting focus on practical politics and his conscious
refusal to indulge in any explicit theorizing suggest that Thucydides discovered
a "new" method of presenting political wisdom, one seemingly opposite that
employed by the Platonic and Xenophontic "Socrates." His work thus invites us
to question anew the approach traditionally associated with political philosophy.
In Thucydides' presentation of the life and death of Greek politics we find his
contemporary relevance to Europe and his contribution to classical Greek
rationalism delicately interwoven. This paper intends to provide an account of
that interweaving.
The commentary on Thucydides' text that follows intends to show that
Thucydides, in revealing the distinctive character of Greek politics as he does,
also indicates the conditions necessary for reflecting on the nature of Greek
political life. By exposing the nature of Greek politics, he points out the limits
facing the common good and thus points to the limit to our capacity to know a
political good that is wholly common. In seeking to abandon a Europe des
patries, contemporary Europeans not only flirt with dangerous utopian visions;
they also risk obscuring our sense of the limits to reason and thus obstructing
the wisdom that reflects our acceptance of them.

The Olympic Character of Greek Politics
To grasp the import of the Greek ideal to Thucydides (and to European
politics), we must begin with his account of the birth of Greek politics. And that
means we must turn to his first comments on Greek politics and Olympic
contests as he presents them together at the very opening of his narrative
account (1.6). In turning to Thucydides' narrative, however, one must exercise
care. His account of the ancient past, like all his narrative, is unusually
compressed, forcing its readers to tease out those insights that govern its
composition. To appreciate the narrative's political wisdom, the reader must
supply on his own the reflections that inform and unite the seemingly offhand
details dotting Thucydides' prose. And the reader can only do this if he works
backwards, as it were, reconstructing Thucydides' political wisdom from the
details that he selected for his narrative. By approaching the archaeology in this
way, we can best discover what makes Greek politics so distinctive.
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Thucydides remarks that it was in Sparta first where the great among the
citizens chose to observe an equality of appearance (isodiaitoi) among the many,
adopting the more modest style of dress worn by the poor. A sense of restraint
on one's outward conduct on behalf of the welfare of others originated in
Sparta. He then notes that the Spartans also originated the Olympic practice of
wrestling in the nude. By having one follow the other Thucydides invites us to
uncover how one of his seemingly irrelevant asides bears on one of his most
explicit and most important political notes. 3
According to the narrative, those who dominate in politics freely choose to
conceal outward appearances of their superiority. Those who aspire to dominate
physically, on the other hand, choose to reveal themselves when competing. By
discarding their clothes, the Spartan wrestlers discard conventional covers and
restraints, staking out a kind of non-conventional, or natural, self-sufficiency.
Because such a self-disclosure aims at revealing one's natural greatness and
beauty, then it cannot be understood as simply a means to the victor's garland;
indeed, the very act of disrobing testifies to one's superiority insofar as it
requires one to overcome the shame of one's nakedness. The concern for how
one competes (clothed or unclothed) thus mediates the concern for victory and
its spoils. The contest's outcome is now understood to confirm about the
contestants what the audience should see with their "own two eyes." Exercising
naked amounts to a claim to the goods of victory in light of one's nature. On the
basis of this innovation, Thucydides draws his first distinction between the
Greeks, who fight in the nude, and the Asiatic barbarians, who cover their
bodies in the pursuit of victory's rewards.
To reconcile the Spartan practice of self disclosure with the Spartan politics
of concealment, we must recall that in the on-going contest to preserve their
rule, the Spartan great voluntarily limit the open exercise of their power by
concealing the appearance of their greatness. Like the grapplers, they eschew
the concern for the material goods that follow from rule in favor of
considerations regarding how they rule. And like the Olympic combatants, they
aim to establish their superiority in terms of self-sufficiency. For who else, but
the supremely self-sufficient, could afford to forego the possession of those
goods that rule affords? Moreover, by donning the garb of the commoners they
refrain from gaudy displays of wealth. The pride of the demos, and thus the
stability of the community, serves to check their pursuit of individual selfinterest. Thus devotion to the community's welfare, understood as the disclosure
of one's superior character, seems to be both a means to legitimate rule and an
essential part of the rule itself.
By crediting the Greeks with generating the concern for "the common,"
Thucydides credits them with discovering politics itself. And by crediting the
Greeks with the discovery of politics, he credits them with revealing more
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clearly than before the human origin of the sense of a rightful limit on selfinterest. Such an interpretation is, of course, by no means obvious, but what
Thucydides tells us about the earliest Athenians, in a note just prior to this
section, lends it support.
Forced to farm Attica's poor soil and dogged by the constant threat of
starvation, the early Athenians naturally possessed a heightened awareness of
their vulnerability and exposure to need. The experience of such constant need
seems to have impressed upon them the fact that no amount of goods could ever
free them from the threat of evils. This awareness was reinforced, paradoxically,
by the fact that some of those who originally settled the city were no weaklings
themselves. They too originally possessed power, but not enough power (they
were dunatotatoi, I.2.6). The depth of the Athenians's concern for selfsufficiency finds perhaps no more artful expression than in the note that later
generations, growing into a more luxurious way of life, discarded the
convention of wearing golden-grasshoppers in their hair (I.6.3), a convention
intended to honor the city's autochthonous gods. 4
By reminding them of their autochthonous gods, such adornments recall
their attachment to and dependence on this particular land, as infertile and
unforgiving as Attica is. By abandoning this convention as they freed
themselves from poverty, the wealthy Athenians revealed their yearning to be
free of their bond to this particular land and the physical neediness that that
bond signified. Their actions testify to their desire to break free from the limits
imposed by both nature and the gods. Their impiety points to their desire for a
complete and total freedom, and thus a self-sufficiency, that is entirely the
product of one's own efforts. Owing itself to no one or no thing outside of one's
self, such freedom appears, quite naturally, limitless. Desires for such freedom
and self-sufficiency, however, seem to be at odds with the earliest Athenians's
initial experiences with both nature and politics. The encounter with an
inhospitable nature combined with their political failures seems to have made
these Athenians keenly aware both that they require external goods to satisfy the
needs which plague them and that they can never have enough power to acquire
all the goods necessary to satisfy such needs. In this light, the endless pursuit of
unlimited power surely appears absurd.
Awareness of this predicament, however, seems perfectly consistent with
both the Spartan efforts at disclosure and concealment. By voluntarily
eschewing the possession of external goods, the Spartan elite, for example,
could establish their superior self-sufficiency-and thus their superior claim to
rule-while circumventing the otherwise absurd effort to satisfy a limitless need.
In fact, in revealing their superior character, the Spartan elite decisively improve
on the example of the wrestlers; one's character is less needy because it is less
vulnerable to the whims of nature and fortune. And because it is independent of
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biology, one's character also appears to be more "one's own"; the selfsufficiency they seek to reveal derives almost entirely from their own efforts. At
any rate, the Greeks appear to provide a rational response to the conflict
between the efforts to satisfy their seemingly endless needs and the limits,
natural or otherwise, to all such efforts.
Given its place at the beginning of Thucydides' discussion of Greekness, we
should not be surprised to find such a political psychology at work in the
wartime efforts of both the Athenians and the Spartans. At the least, those cases
when Thucydides draws our attention to Olympic contestants should reinforce
the lessons so subtly intimated in his narrative even as they invite us to bring our
earlier insights to bear on the passages in question.

Cylon
Cylon is the first Olympic victor noted in the History (l.26). He was an
Athenian noble who attempted to overthrow the city of Athens and establish
himself as tyrant. Cylon based the date of his coup on the Delphic oracle's
prophecy that he should seize Athens on the greatest festival day. And he
presumed the greatest festival day to occur during the Olympic festivals since he
was crowned Olympic champion during these holidays. Cylon thus appears
fueled by the conviction of his superiority as revealed in his Olympic victory.
And he appears to desire to dominate Athens openly to reveal his own greatness
just as the Olympic wrestlers revealed themselves in part to disclose their
natural superiority.
But while consideration of Olympic nudity suggested the contestants
understood their victory to reveal their attention to some rightful limit on their
quest for victory, Cylon's story suggests that he wanted to rule Athens alone and
without limit. He did not see, as the Spartan great saw, that to establish his true
superiority he must establish his independence from the goods that come with
ruling. Nor did he see that this is best effected through service to others. Had he
reflected on what he hoped to win by the possession of a good like political rule,
he might have seen that devotion to the common good and not tyranny best
reveals one's superiority.
To come to such an insight, Cylon would have had to reflect on those
physical and psychological needs driving him to pursue tyranny. And such
reflection would have forced him to accept the limits to his political hopes and
thereby moderate his political aims. At least this is what the details of his story
would suggest. For instance, Thucydides notes here that another religious
festival was also considered the greatest - the Diasia, a festival celebrated
outside the city. He also notes, as a seeming aside, that most of those who live
outside the city are poor and that, on account of their poverty, the poor who
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participate in the Diasia do so by sacrificing to the god animals fashioned out of
cake (I.126.6). By distinguishing this festival of Zeus by the presence and
participation of the poor, this seemingly minor detail's political relevance
emerges much more clearly. Thucydides' apparent aside here invites us to
contrast the example of the demos, whose poverty and neediness compel them at
once to sacrifice and to moderate their sacrifices, with that of the wealthy
nobleman Cylon, who seeks unlimited political power for himself.
Because Cylon does not include the Diasia in his political calculations, he
does not think of the poor, the bodily needs that plague them, and the pieties that
moderate their sacrifices. And this failure mirrors his misinterpretation of the
oracle. Insofar as he judges his Olympic victory to confirm his superior worth,
and insofar as this judgment clouds his interpretation of the prophecy, Cylon
fails to see that his superiority is best revealed through political moderation.
Because his misinterpretation of the oracle allows him to forget what is nearest
to his city, like the religious festival in Attica, then it appears that Cylon has not
sufficiently reflected on what is nearest to him, like the neediness that drives
him to pursue immoderate political rule.
In light of his Olympic victory, Cylon's failure in Athens compels one to
raise questions about the link between one's presumed natural superiority and
the recognition by others of that quality: if he was manifestly superior to
Athens' current rulers then how could he have failed? His failure forces us to
ask whether the presumed good of political rule, with its public recognition of
who is politically superior, satisfies what men like Cylon seek in disclosing their
greatness. After all, how can the public confirmation of his greatness testify to
his superior self-sufficiency and thus superior goodness when he also depends
so completely on the public's approbation? The following digression on
Pausanias (I.128-135. l) and Themistocles (I.135.2-138), two men also charged
with aspiring to tyranny, deepen these reflections.

Alcibiades
Of course, to see these reflections confirmed, we must tum to Thucydides'
presentation of Alcibiades. After all, few Greeks in Thucydides' work represent
Greek greatness like Alcibiades. 5 Surely he, of all figures, represents the
psychology of the Olympic champion. But Alcibiades did not participate in the
Olympic games; he sponsored the chariots who were first, second and fourth
victors at the Olympic games (VI.16). Such distance from the field of
competition finds its parallel in his curious absence from the field of battle.
Given his reckless political ambitions one is surprised to discover that we never
witness Alcibiades engaged in armed conflict. He is always behind the action,
trying to orchestrate the great political drama unfolding before him. This fact
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reflects the amazing indirection characteristic of his policies as a whole (see for
instance, Vl.48); his plans always rely on deceit, feints, and playing his
opponents off of each other. Such indirectness of action, however, contrasts
strikingly with the candor with which he asserts in speech both his right to rule
his fellow Athenians (VI.16) and his pursuit of even loftier ambitions (Vl.8992).
Alcibiades' apparent refusal to engage in direct conflict with others,
however, does not stem from any reservations about his superior qualities as
much as it stems from his profound belief that they are so manifestly great as to
render any direct contest unnecessary. In this way, his character embodies a
more rational stage in Olympic political psychology. For by reflecting on the
questions occasioned by Cylon's failure, one must also raise questions about the
very logic behind Olympic victors. If one's greatness is in fact as manifest as
one supposes, then what explains the need to have it confirmed by others? To
pursue such confirmation through physical contest is to admit tacitly that one's
greatness is not as manifest as originally supposed. And a coerced confirmation
is not nearly as sweet as one freely granted. Awareness of such points seems to
explain Alcibiades' resort to persuasion as opposed to force. Through speech he
can reveal his course of action to be the superior course, and through the rational
disclosure of such superiority he can gain the voluntary compliance of his
audience.
Of course, to say that Alcibiades reflects a more rational development of
Olympic political psychology is not to say that his perspective is simply
rational. For if Alcibiades does not wish to compete openly for the public's
recognition of his virtue, then his title to rule will always remain in question. On
the other hand, if he does deign to test his worth openly-through force or
speech-then he must admit that a question exists as to his manifest superiority.
Alcibiades surely knows, for instance, that his political enemies, be they
Athenians, Spartans or Persians, will not simply acquiesce to his political will.
Their resistance alone should cause him to reflect on the divergent interests that
define political life; it should lead him to reflect on the connection between
one's presumed greatness, which should be its own reward, and the goods one
believes to be owed on account of that presumption.
These reflections emerge most clearly in Thucydides' lengthiest treatment of
Olympic victors and Olympic games (V.49-50 and ff). Thucydides notes that
during the games in the 12th year of the war the Boeotian-led chariot of the
Spartan Lichas was declared victorious. So that all the Greeks would know he
was responsible for the win, Lichas crowned his driver in the middle of the
concourse. Because it had recently been declared unlawful for Spartans to
attend, participate in or even sacrifice at the games, Lichas was publicly
whipped. Unable to resist the desire to reveal his responsibility for the chariot's
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victory, Lichas's actions implicitly testify that winning by itself (if on the sly) is
not enough; he needs the Greek world to witness his superiority even though it
might mean, oddly enough, risking the stain of impiety and public humiliation.
Had he been content merely with the knowledge of his chariot's victory-that is,
had he been more moderate in his expectations about what victory could mean
for him-Lichas could have left the Olympic Games unscathed. His example
suggests that understanding one's superior self-sufficiency as a good in itself is
perfectly consistent with a prudence that requires us, at times, to practice a
certain concealment.
While Lichas, the Spartan sponsor of charioteers, suffers the shortcomings of
his "Olympic" understanding, Alcibiades, his Athenian parallel, manages to
avoid a similar fate. Always able to wiggle out of a jam, Alcibiades is never
compelled by some political failure to ask how voluntarily limiting the pursuit
of self interest can be at once the means to his good and the very good he
pursues. Nor do we see him ask what is so sensible about concealing himself in
the service of revealing his greatness. Were he to raise such questions,
Alcibiades would also be led to wonder how the political rule he seeks can
reveal and thereby establish his superiority if it is also and at the same time
supposed to confirm a superiority that should already be manifest. Put
differently, if one's greatness is understood in terms of self-sufficiency, then one
cannot also claim, as Alcibiades does, to be entitled to extra goods on account of
that greatness. At any rate, one might expect such questions, if asked, to
introduce at least a temporary pause in one's pursuit of political rule, a pause we
see nowhere in Alcibiades' frenzied career.
By helping us raise these questions, however, Thucydides illustrates for the
reader the incoherence of the Olympic perspective. Through the figure of
Alcibiades we see how the Greek response to one's physical and psychological
neediness-which originally gave birth to the concern for the common good and
. , the discovery of justice-can lead to the subordination of the common good to
individual self-interest, and thus to injustice. After all, Alcibiades, perhaps the
fullest flowering of the Greek ideal, also represents the work's greatest traitor.
By arranging political events to highlight his own greatness, Alcibiades earned a
most infamous reputation as a double-dealer. Alcibiades' promise and apparent
betrayal allow us to see more clearly how a war whose greatness consists in the
suffering, lawlessness and injustice it wrought, could arise among the Greeks,
who were the very cradle of justice and politics itself. In so indicating the single
root of justice and injustice, Thucydides prepares us to wonder if justice, as it
emerges in ancient Greece, possesses an unblemished integrity. Or is it
inextricably linked to the injustice it opposes?
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Faced with such questions, we are led to wonder if there exists a more
adequate response to those needs that led to the Greek discovery of politics.
Again, Thucydides' most extended treatment of Olympic victors and Olympic
Games (V.49-50) proves crucial to this quest. Thucydides identifies these games
not by the impiety of Lichas, but by the victory of Androsthenes of Arcadia.
Because this is the only reference to Androsthenes in his massive work,
Thucydides' note here focuses our attention on his Arcadian background. Given
the brevity of our task, we can only speculate about the importance of such a
tiny region to Thucydides' broader purposes. Two observations here will
suffice: Arcadia is mentioned along with Athens as the only regions in Greece
whose soil lacked natural virtue (I.2) and it is ultimately responsible for giving
Sicily its name (V.2).
As one commentator notes 6 , Thucydides' introduction to Athens suggests
that her natural poverty proved critical to the emergence of her political talent
and, ultimately, her imperial power. Thucydides' artistry thus presents Arcadia
as an alternative to Athens, one whose response to her own neediness and
vulnerability did not lead to conquest and empire, but rather to the emergence of
an island power that would deal Athens its greatest defeat. Of course, given her
location in the heart of the Peloponnese, Arcadia could never develop that stable
population which proved so important to the growth of Athenian power. But
even the great island-power Sicily, like Arcadia herself, never sought dominion
over others. Rather, she defended herself against the unprovoked aggression of
an imperialist Athens. Moreover, unlike every other Olympic victor noted in the
History 7 , Androsthenes, the Arcadian champion of the Pancration, never sought
to translate his Olympic victory into political domination; apparently he did not
understand his victory to entitle him to additional goods. Might it not be the case
then that Thucydides intends to present Arcadia and Arcadians as reflecting an
alternative response to those needs that led Athens, Cylon, and Alcibiades to
seek the full disclosure of their greatness through political domination? Might
Arcadia's example suggest that a more moderate understanding of natural
greatness, borne from a profound initiation into human need and thus human
limits, can be consistent with policies of restraint and concealment?
Such suggestions, though tempting, must also account for the fact that
Arcadia herself was always subject to invasion by others and that her political
heirs, the Sicilians responsible for naming their island, were eventually
supplanted by the Syracusans. And the best examples of political moderation
and prosperity in the work, Sicily, Chios and Sparta, owe such benefits to their
outward domination of others. In fact, the History as a whole clearly shows that
cities cannot practice such restraint and concealment if they hope to thrive and
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remain free. But perhaps individuals can practice a restraint and concealment
that is nevertheless consistent with their natural greatness. While men like
Cylon, Alcibiades and Lichas do not practice such restraint or concealment,
another notable political "failure" does. Could Thucydides embody the solution
to the problems confronting Olympic victors?

Thucydides' Love of Victory
While no Olympic champion, Thucydides informs us that he too seeks
victory in his contest with the poets (1. 9-11; 19-22). The character of the victory
he seeks best comes to light by reflecting on his famous methodological
comments near the beginning of Book I (22). Thucydides' particular method is
crucial insofar as it is his distinctive approach to political affairs that constitutes
his superiority over the poets. These comments insist on two strict distinctions:
1.) between the speeches and deeds of the History's actors and 2.) between
Thucydides' judgment and historical accuracy. A concern with historical
accuracy governed his treatment of the deeds, while he composed the speeches
with a view to what was, in his judgment, necessary under the given
circumstances.
This is a notoriously difficult passage, so we shall limit ourselves to a few
simple observations. 8 First, as reflection on the History shows, the speeches and
deeds of the History's actors are not as distinct as Thucydides insists. After all,
aren't delivered speeches themselves deeds? And the line between his concern
with historical accuracy and his own view of what was necessary also tends to
blur. Again, didn't Thucydides select and arrange which episodes and speeches
he judged necessary to report?
Were it not for his artistry, we might be inclined to attribute such apparent
inconsistencies to Thucydides' carelessness. But if Thucydides is in control of
his work, as he surely is, we must ask why he invites his reader to cast doubt on
the adequacy of his methods through the very manner in which he presents
them. If he wants to point out the insufficiency of strict distinctions between
speech and deed or between historical accuracy and his own judgment, then why
not just say so?
One of the virtues of proceeding so indirectly is that by insisting on the
explicit distinctions between speech and deed and between his treatment of
speeches and deeds, even as he acts to the contrary, Thucydides can bring to
light the character of such distinctions in a manner that is faithful to their
absence. And if Thucydides' speech does in fact eschew the strict distinction
drawn between the speeches and deeds of the History's actors, then he can
hardly be expected to draw the distinction between his speech and the speeches
and deeds of the war so distinctly. To do so would be to commit the very fallacy
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he seeks to correct. He can thus quietly indicate the character of his own
"speech" even as he "speaks" openly of the speeches and deeds of the History's
actors. But such observations should unsettle us since they leave us with the
impression that Thucydides practices an almost unheard of indirection in his
presentation of political life. In this way, he reminds us ofDiodotus who, in his
speech on the fate of the Mytileneans, informs his fellow Athenians of the need
to lie to them (III.43).
The necessity and political relevance of such concealment emerge when we
recall Thucydides' treatment of the Greek love of victory. In detailing the roots
in human nature of the desire for self-disclosure, Thucydides sketched the single
origin of both justice and injustice. By subtly indicating that the justice which
defines Greek political life also issues in or requires injustice, he pointed us to
the obstacles confronting our ability to realize (and thus to know) a universal,
unified, and unblemished moral category like a "justice as such." Thucydides'
treatment of speeches and deeds reflects this insight insofar as that treatment's
blurring of the distinction between speeches and deeds suggests that universal
categories-which can only exist in the realm of pure speech-cannot exist apart
from the particulars that constitute them. By pointing to the necessity of
particulars for understanding universal categories, Thucydides' speech,
informed by his insight into Greek politics, discloses a limit to our ability to
know universals simply. 9
It would seem then that in his recognition and observance of such limits lies
Thucydides' victory over the poets. As his presentation of his great rival
suggests, Homer seeks the applause of his audience (III.104). In fact, Homer,
just like any other athlete, participated in the musical contests of the Delian
games, seeking the public praise of his poetry. In seeking victory at Delos,
Homer seeks the recognition of his greatness and thus the external confirmation
of his superior nature. He thus appears to share the political perspective of the
Olympic victors. Moreover, his desire for such praise implies that he has not
seen the problems with the view that Thucydides brings to light for us. And
because his poetry serves such goals (see again III. I 04), one should not be
surprised to discover that it suffers from the same problems facing those athletes
and statesmen who see in their victories more than there is. Thus, one of
Thucydides' first criticisms of Homeric poetry was that it exaggerated the war's
greatness; like the Olympic champions, Homer saw in the Trojan War more than
there really was.
In light of this, it would appear that the poets overlook the moral and
political shortcomings that Thucydides grasps. Perhaps then they also fail to
appreciate the limitations to reason that are their consequence. Thucydides
triumphs over the poets because his work reveals the truth about human limits
while still obeying such limits. And while the observance of such limits
'
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discloses his greatness to us, as it did with the Spartan wrestlers and political
elite, he does not require us to confirm that greatness for him. He wrote his work
for neither applause nor prizes, but to be permanently useful (1.22). Of course,
the lessons drawn out from Thucydides' presentation of Greek politics need not
merely apply to his backwards glance at the poets. They might also serve as a
preemptive criticism of those who follow Thucydides' efforts to present the
enduring truth about human affairs. They suggest that Thucydides anticipated
the difficulties that could beset the more direct dialectical inquiry employed by
Socrates in the Platonic and Xenophontic dialogues. And these theoretical
insights return us to the contemporary relevance of Thucydides.

Thucydides and Europe
According to Pierre Manent 10 , the movement towards greater European
unification is fueled by the belief that effectively erasing national borders within
Europe will do away with the preconditions for warfare; no national boundaries
means nothing to fight over. Europeans can cease worrying that they might
someday revisit the horrors of the last century. This hope that that they can do
away with war on the continent also stems from the view that war is little more
than violent commerce. Given the sophisticated nature of modern free-market
economies, we can peacefully address the commercial needs of men and nations
and consider war a barbaric relic of a bygone age. A true union of European
states represents the promise of a political good common to all Europeans by
making national borders politically insignificant and enhancing Europe's
economic standing in the world.
Thucydides' History, however, shows modern Europeans to be wrong on
both counts. At the heart of the Greek love of victory, and thus conquest and
war, is not the desire for commercial gain, but rather the full revelation of one's
natural greatness. More importantly, he shows that the desire to reveal one's
greatness finds its fullest and most consistent realization not in tyranny but in
service to the common good. And this means one needs a vision of the common
good that can arouse one's manly desire to assert his greatness on its behalf. But
in the effort to abandon the politics of grandeur, modern Europeans obstruct any
effort to articulate or even think about goods that are common to all; afraid of
endorsing the exclusive goods they want to transcend, they shrink from putting
goods "in common." They thus enervate those hidden springs within man that
generate grand political action. And without any robust notion of the common
good, one cannot hope individuals will simply restrain on their own the selfish
pursuit of their ambitions. Nor can one reliably expect others to resist the efforts
of their most talented and ambitious citizens. The tyranny they fear thus
becomes more, not less, likely.
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Of course, Thucydides' account of Greek politics also points to the tenuous
nature of the justice that defines it. By pointing to the close link between justice
and injustice, he points to the futility of all utopian schemes dedicated to
realizing a good that is unambiguously common to all. His dramatic illustration
of Olympic political psychology should thus temper the European propensity,
cultivated by its century long experience with ideology, to seek political
solutions embracing all of humanity. But more than this, the History offers a
powerful, if quiet, warning for European political scientists. It suggests that the
very effort to instantiate a community such as the E.U. clouds their capacity for
genuine political reflection and self-examination. As Thucydides' methods
suggested, one could only reliably gain access to "universal" political wisdom
through reflection on the particulars that constitute political categories. But by
trying to transcend particular national distinctions, contemporary Europeans
undermine the very conditions required for the study of politics. Their utopian
vision blinds them to the limits of reason, leaving them politically shortsighted
and incapable of bearing witness to Thucydides' greatness. In presenting the life
and death of Greek politics as he does, Thucydides reminds those concerned
with Europe's apolitical drift of the humane necessity of politics while
highlighting the fragility of Europe's most precious inheritance.
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